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INTRODUCTION 
Recent population data suggests that the United States’ 
racial and ethnic composition is rapidly changing.  Recently, 
the Hispanic community eclipsed the African American 
community as the most prevalent minority group in the 
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United States, comprising an estimated 16.3% of the 
population in 2010.1  Additionally, the population of Asian-
Pacific Americans has increased to 4.8% of the total 
population. 2   While those numbers indicate a significant 
change in the composition of the United States generally, the 
population concentrations in specific states reveal more 
drastic growth rates. 3   Specifically, ten states including 
Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Texas, New 
Jersey, New Mexico, Nevada, and New York indicate 
numbers grossly inconsistent with the national standards.4  
The 2010 Census indicated that the Asian-Pacific American 
population in California had increased by 31.47% statewide.5  
Some cities, such as San Francisco, now have Asian- 
Pacific American populations of over 30%.6  Moreover, Latin 
Americans comprise more than 37% of the California and 
Texas populations, and almost 30% of the Arizona population 
according to 2010 census.7  Given these numbers, one would 
expect significant minority representation in elected office.  
However, most minority groups only win elections by “narrow 
margins” and lack true political power.8 
Minority groups frustrated by a lack of representation 
turn to other remedies to ensure that their votes carry equal 
strength, but often find that the current analytical approach 
 1. State and County QuickFacts: USA, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2010). 
 2. Id. 
 3. John O. Calmore, Race-Conscious Voting Rights and the New 
Demography in a Multiracing America, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1253, 1262 (2001). 
 4. Id. 
 5. See Profile of General Demographic Characteristics: 2000, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, 1, http://censtats.census.gov/data/CA/04006.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 
2011) (4,861,007–3,697,513)/3,697,513 = 0.31467 * 100 = 31.467%); 2010 Census 
Interactive Population Search, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://2010.census.gov/ 
2010census/popmap/ipmtext.php?fl=06 (last visited Nov. 13, 2011). 
 6. Kathay Feng, Keith Aoki & Bryan Ikegami, Voting Matters: AIPAs, 
Latinas/os and Post-2000 Redistricting in California, 81 OR. L. REV. 849, 885 
(2002). 
 7. State and County QuickFacts: California, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06000.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2010); 
State and County QuickFacts: Texas, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts. 
census.gov/qfd/states/48000.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2010); State and County 
QuickFacts: Arizona, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/ 
states/04000.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2010). 
 8. Quyen L. Ta, Comment, Vietnamese Americans, the Voting Rights Act, 
and Electoral Power: Challenges to Being Counted, 10 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. 
L.J. 88, 97 (2005). 
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adopted by the Supreme Court for section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act (VRA) prohibits redress through its strict size and 
dispersion requirements.9  To meet the requirements, several 
minority groups have attempted to aggregate for the purposes 
of filing a section 2 claim, but courts have expressed 
resistance to granting relief without a heightened showing of 
group cohesion.10  Scholars argue that the under-inclusive 
nature of the Thornburg v. Gingles11 approach, combined with 
the increasingly diverse ethnical composition of the United 
States, fails to address true instances of vote dilution and 
requires reexamination by the Supreme Court.12 
This Comment begins by exploring the history of the 
VRA, the current standards applied to minority groups filing 
section 2 challenges, and the methods employed by minority 
groups to gain protection under the VRA, specifically minority 
aggregation.  Part I of this Comment discusses the history of 
the VRA, beginning with the general reasoning behind the 
legislation and the history of its current standards—including 
the currently applicable Thornburg v. Gingles analytical 
standard—and culminates with a discussion of the diverging 
views expressed by the federal circuit courts regarding 
minority aggregation.13   Next, Part II identifies problems 
created by the conflicting views of minority aggregation, and 
the lack of a clearly defined standard of review for aggregated 
section 2 claims.14  Part III discusses the current proposals for 
assessing section 2 claims by aggregated minorities, ranging 
from imposing a completely new standard, to requiring a 
heightened showing of cohesion between both groups. 15  
Finally, Part IV suggests an improved standard for the 
aggregation of minority groups, taking into account the 
diverging perspectives.16 
 9. Id. at 101–02. 
 10. Angelo N. Ancheta & Kathryn K. Imahara, Multi-Ethnic Voting Rights: 
Redefining Vote Dilution in Communities of Color, 27 U.S.F. L. REV. 815, 845 
(1993). 
 11. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 (1986). 
 12. See Ancheta & Imahara, supra note 10, at 845–48. 
 13. See infra Part I. 
 14. See infra Part II. 
 15. See infra Part III. 
 16. See infra Part IV. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A.  The Voting Rights Act Generally 
The protection of voting rights for minority groups in the 
United States began with the passage of the Fifteenth 
Amendment, which states that “[t]he right of citizens of the 
United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by  
the United States or by any State on account of race,  
color, or previous condition of servitude.”17  However, as the 
legislature began to protect the voting rights of ethnic 
minorities, new ways to disenfranchise these groups 
evolved.18  The new disenfranchisement methods encouraged 
further legislative efforts to increase voting rights 
protections, resulting in the 1965 enactment of the VRA.19  
Originally, the VRA protections largely centered on the 
constitutional guarantees offered by the Fifteenth 
Amendment, and consisted of two basic sections.20  Section 2 
sought to codify generally the Fifteenth Amendment’s 
protection by stating that “[n]o voting qualification or 
prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure 
shall be imposed or applied by any State or political 
subdivision in a manner that results in a denial or 
abridgment of the right of any citizen of the United States to 
vote on account of race or color.”21  Despite the prohibitions of 
section 2, Congress determined that the VRA needed the 
additional power of section 5.22  Section 5 applies only to 
specific jurisdictions with a high incidence of, or potential for, 
minority disenfranchisement.23  Section 5 requires that the 
 17. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
 18. The new methods of vote dilution included the use of multi-member 
districts and strategies, which over-concentrated a minority into a single 
district or dispersed minority groups so widely amongst the majority group in 
several districts to limit their political influence.  See Feng, Aoki & Ikegami, 
supra note 6, at 863–66. 
 19. Id. at 863. 
 20. The Voting Rights Act of 1965, U.S. DEP’T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/ 
crt/about/vot/intro/intro_b.php (last visited Dec. 16, 2010). 
 21. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2006). 
 22. See Joaquin G. Avila, Eugene Lee & Terry M. Ao, Voting Rights in 
California: 1982–2006, 17 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 131, 137 (2007). 
 23. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act applies to any jurisdiction that 
maintains “a ‘test or device,’ restricting the opportunity to register and vote” 
based on ethnic or language minority status.  About Section 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act, U.S. DEP’T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/ 
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federal government receive preclearance for any voting 
changes in the state from the U.S. Attorney General or the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.24  In its 
current form, the VRA prohibits restrictions that prevent 
ethnic or language minorities from having an equal 
opportunity to elect their chosen representatives.25  Upon 
finding that these protections are a continuing necessity, 
Congress passed extensions of the VRA several times over 
twenty-five years, most recently in 2006.26 
B. The History of Section 2 Vote Dilution Claims 
Section 2 applies broadly to all U.S. jurisdictions.27  It 
bars states from imposing requirements that negatively  
affect a minority’s right to participate equally in the  
political process. 28   With such a wide scope, it applies  
to most types of minority disenfranchisement based on race,29 
allowing minorities to bring claims for vote dilution suits.30  
Vote dilution is understood as the “second generation” of U.S. 
voting rights law.31  Allowing vote dilution claims ensures 
about.php (last visited Oct. 11, 2011).  If a jurisdiction maintained such a 
device, then it became “covered” by section 5, and any “change with respect to 
voting in a covered jurisdiction . . . cannot legally be enforced unless and until 
the jurisdiction” first receives approval from the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia or the Attorney General.  Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Sebastian Geraci, Comment, The Case Against Allowing Multiracial 
Coalitions to File Section 2 Dilution Claims, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 389, 391 
(1995). 
 26. Bush Signs Voting Rights Act Extension, MSNBC.COM, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14059113/#.TujqDlZ9J90 (last visited Feb. 2, 
2012). 
 27. Feng, Aoki & Ikegami, supra note 6, at 864. 
 28. Id. 
 29. “The Act originally protected only black voters.  When it was amended 
in 1975 to reach language minorities, the Act then identified four new covered 
groups: persons of Spanish heritage; all American Indians; ‘Asian Americans’ 
including Chinese, Japanese, Korean and Filipino Americans; and Alaskan 
natives.”  League of United Latin Am. Citizens, Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 
999 F.2d 831, 894 (5th Cir. 1993) (Jones, J., concurring) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 
1973(b)(f)(1) (1988)). 
 30. See Aylon M. Schulte, Minority Aggregation Under Section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act: Toward Just Representation in Ethnically Diverse 
Communities, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 441, 445 (1995). 
 31. The first-generation of voting rights suits “largely sought to vindicate 
classic examples of individual rights” by focusing on “individual citizens casting 
individual ballots.”  Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an 
Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1663, 1671 (2001).  However, the second-
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that racial minorities have an equal opportunity to elect their 
representatives. 32   These claims require a level of racial 
polarization, where “white and racial minorities consistently 
prefer different candidates.” 33   Vote dilution can occur 
through two schemes, they are typically known as “cracking” 
and “packing.”34 
Historically, vote dilution claims developed in response to 
the states’ use of at-large voting methods.35  The Supreme 
Court sought to solve the problem of vote dilution in at-large 
districts through invalidation and replacement with single-
member districts.36  However, through creative redistricting 
plans, states still retained the power to dilute the votes of 
racial minorities by drawing districts in which white 
residents consistently formed a majority.37  Responding to 
these methods required clearer standards for bringing section 
2 claims.38 
Claims pertaining to vote dilution under the VRA have 
been subject to varying proof requirements throughout their 
history.39  At the VRA’s inception the courts interpreted its 
standards to require proof only of discriminatory effects.40  
This general consensus lasted from the VRA’s inception 
through 1980.41  However, in Mobile v. Bolden42 the Supreme 
generation challenges include the rights of a racial group.  Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Feng describes packing as “the overconcentration of minority group 
populations into one or two districts for the purpose of minimizing their sphere 
of legislative influence” and cracking as dispersing “minorities . . . among 
different districts so no one district has enough minorities to influence the 
political process.”  Feng, Aoki & Ikegami, supra note 6, at 864. 
 35. Gerken, supra note 31, at 1672.  The first vote dilution suits focused on 
individual rights.  However, the suits evolved and began to focus on the rights of 
an entire racial group.  Id.  Additionally, “at-large voting methods” refers to 
“statewide races” where “more than one representative is elected from a single 
district.”  Id. 
 36. Id. at 1673. 
 37. See id. at 1675. 
 38. See Rick G. Strange, Application of Voting Rights Act to Communities 
Containing Two or More Minority Groups—When is the Whole Greater than the 
Sum of the Parts?, 20 TEX. TECH L. REV. 95, 107–08 (1989). 
 39. Id. at 100–11. 
 40. See id. at 100. 
 41. Feng, Aoki & Ikegami, supra note 6, at 864. 
 42. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), superseded by statute, 
Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 134, as 
recognized in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
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Court held that section 2 “was intended to have an effect no 
different from that of the Fifteenth Amendment itself.”43  This 
holding altered the standard that had been in place for  
the first fifteen years of the VRA’s enforcement and im- 
posed a new requirement of discriminatory intent.44  The new 
requirement made it nearly impossible to bring claims  
under section 2 and ceased voting rights challenges  
almost entirely.45   However in 1982, Congress intervened  
and codified the discriminatory effects standard, indicating 
that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the standard  
of proof did not comply with Congress’ intent.46  The new 
discriminatory effects standard required a multi-factor 
analysis of the Senate Report Factors, which included: the 
extent of the history of official voting discrimination; the 
existence of racially polarized voting; election practices that 
enhanced the opportunity for discrimination against the 
minority group; denial of access to minority groups in the 
candidate slating process; the extent to which minority 
groups bore the effects of discrimination in such areas as 
education and employment, which hindered their ability to 
participate in politics; racial campaign appeals; the electoral 
success of minorities; whether elected officials significantly 
failed to respond to minority groups needs; and whether the 
policy underlying the state or political subdivision’s use of 
such voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, 
practice or procedure was tenuous.47  These factors elucidated 
the variety of ways minority voting rights may be diluted, 
although Congress clearly asserted that the adoption of this 
standard does not grant minorities a right of proportional 
representation.48 
C. Analysis of Thornburg v. Gingles 
While the Supreme Court and Congress dealt with the 
overarching burden of proof, plaintiffs still required guidance 
 43. Id. at 61. 
 44. Strange, supra note 38, at 101. 
 45. Schulte, supra note 30, at 447. 
 46. Id. 
 47. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28–29 (1982), quoted in Ancheta & Imahara, 
supra note 10, at 837–38. 
 48. Schulte, supra note 30, at 448. 
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630 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52 
on the scope of section 2’s protection for vote dilution claims.49  
In the landmark case of Thornburg v. Gingles, the Supreme 
Court outlined three requirements for bringing section 2 vote 
dilution claims in a multi-member district. 50   First, the 
minority group must “demonstrate that it is sufficiently large 
and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a 
single-member district.”51  The Supreme Court required this 
showing to demonstrate that the voting system or voting 
practices are responsible for the minority’s inability to elect a 
candidate of their choosing.52  Second, “the minority group 
must be able to show that it is politically cohesive.”53  The 
political cohesion requirement was also directed towards 
proving that the multi-member structure consistently  
defeats the minority’s interests.54  Additionally, the first two 
requirements spoke to the minority’s ability to elect a  
single candidate of its choosing.55  Third, the Supreme Court 
required that the minority group show that “the white 
majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it—in the 
absence of special circumstances, . . . to defeat the minority’s 
preferred candidate.”56  Essentially, requiring minorities to 
prove that their inclusion in a “white multimember district” 
diminished their ability to select their representatives.57 
 The Supreme Court added to these requirements in 
Johnson v. De Grandy,58 by holding that if a plaintiff meets 
all three requirements, then the court must determine 
whether “under the ‘totality of the circumstances,’ the 
minority group has less opportunity than other members of 
the electorate to participate in the electoral process and to 
elect representatives of their choice.”59  The Supreme Court 
 49. See Strange, supra note 38, at 106–07. 
 50. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50–51 (1986). 
 51. Id. at 50. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 51. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240, 1244 (5th Cir. 1988). 
 56. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51.  The term “white voting bloc” refers to the 
similarity of the majority’s voting pattern.  By demonstrating that the majority 
group voted in a cohesive manner, the minority group showed how “a white 
multi-member district impeded its ability to elect its chosen representatives.”  
Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994). 
 59. Feng, Aoki & Ikegami, supra note 6, at 866.  The court utilized the 
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later applied this analytical approach to single-member 
districts in Growe v. Emison.60  As a direct result of the 
Supreme Court’s enumeration of these factors, the vote 
dilution cases became the work of various experts.61  Plaintiffs 
required a certain amount of qualitative data to satisfy the 
burden of proof imposed solely by the first three factors.62  
However, the imposition of the clear elemental approach only 
led to more questions about section 2 claims.63 
D. Minority Aggregation 
After the Supreme Court’s enumeration of the Gingles 
factors for section 2 dilution claims, some minorities felt 
compelled to aggregate in order to meet the Gingles 
requirements.64  Despite the amount of Congressional and 
Supreme Court involvement with the VRA, both bodies 
remained silent on the aggregation of minorities for the 
purposes of bringing a section 2 claim.65  However, in Emison, 
the Supreme Court acknowledged that while it would not 
directly decide whether aggregated minorities could bring 
section 2 vote dilution claims, if an aggregated minority 
attempted to do so, all three Gingles preconditions  
must be met.66  Therefore, courts have fallen into one of three 
categories in deciding aggregated minority vote dilution suits.  
Either, (1) expressly accepting a minority’s right to aggregate; 
(2) implicitly accepting the right to aggregate by applying the 
Gingles factors to aggregated minorities, without addressing 
directly if a right to aggregate exists; or (3) expressly rejecting 
the right to aggregate.67 
1.  Express Acceptance of the Right to Aggregate 
The Fifth Circuit has emerged as the leader of the first 
group by expressly allowing minority aggregation in several 
Senate Report Factors to complete the totality of the circumstances analysis.  Id. 
at 866 n.67. 
 60. Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 40–41 (1993). 
 61. Gerken, supra note 31, at 1674. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 1675. 
 64. Strange, supra note 38, at 115. 
 65. Schulte, supra note 30, at 442. 
 66. See Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 40–42 (1993). 
 67. See Schulte, supra note 30, at 454. 
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632 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52 
cases.68  In 1988, the Fifth Circuit expressly validated the 
practice of minority aggregation in Campos v. City of 
Baytown.69  The plaintiffs, an aggregated group of African 
American and Hispanic American voters, filed a section 2  
vote dilution suit challenging the City of Baytown’s at- 
large election method.70  The District Court for the Southern 
District of Texas ruled in favor of the aggregated minority.71  
On appeal, the City of Baytown challenged the district court’s 
decision, arguing that the claim did not sufficiently meet all 
three of the Gingles factors.72  By affirming the decision of the 
district court, the Fifth Circuit expressly accepted the 
practice of aggregating minorities for section 2 claims but also 
suggested a standard for handling aggregated claims by 
applying the Gingles analysis.73 
First, by finding that the African American and Hispanic 
American populations constituted a “sufficiently large and 
geographically compact”74 group to comprise a majority in a 
single-member district, the Fifth Circuit strictly construed 
the Gingles standard and stated that the existence of 
minority group members outside the potential minority 
district does not affect the groups’ ability to meet the first 
requirement.75 
As to the second Gingles requirement, the City of 
Baytown posed two challenges: whether the plaintiffs focused 
on the correct elections to demonstrate cohesion and whether 
the evidence itself demonstrated cohesion.76  In response to 
the first challenge, that the plaintiffs did not study a 
sufficient number of elections nor the correct elections, the 
Fifth Circuit echoed the Supreme Court’s determination that 
the number of and which elections the plaintiff must study 
varies by case.77  More specifically, the Fifth Circuit accepted 
the Supreme Court’s suggestion that “the number of elections 
in which the minority group has sponsored candidates” 
 68. Geraci, supra note 25, at 395–97. 
 69. Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240, 1241 (5th Cir. 1988). 
 70. Id. at 1242. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 1244, 1246. 
 73. Id. at 1244. 
 74. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 (1986). 
 75. Campos, 840 F.2d at 1244. 
 76. Id. at 1244–47. 
 77. Id. at 1245. 
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2012] MINORITY BURDENS UNDER THE VRA 633 
constitutes an important circumstance.78  By applying both 
Supreme Court suggestions, the Fifth Circuit determined that 
the plaintiffs correctly assessed only the races in which either 
minority group had a member running.79  As to the greater 
challenge of demonstrating cohesion, the Fifth Circuit 
affirmed the finding of cohesion based upon the plaintiff’s 
statistical evidence produced at trial.80  In response to the 
City of Baytown’s assertion that insufficient evidence existed 
to support a finding of racially polarized voting, the Fifth 
Circuit held that “Gingles does not require total white bloc 
voting” but simply the existence of enough white bloc votes to 
“usually defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.”81  Finally, 
during its application of the Senate Report Factors, to 
complete the totality of the circumstances analysis, the  
Fifth Circuit specifically noted the importance of the  
minority groups’ shared history of discrimination.82  Through 
the Campos holding, the Fifth Circuit expressly accepted the 
practice of aggregating racial minorities to bring a section 2 
claim, by simply meeting the Gingles requirements.83 
The Fifth Circuit furthered its acceptance of minority 
vote aggregation in League of United Latin American Citizens 
v. Clements (LULAC I).84  The challenge in LULAC I also 
 78. Id.  The Gingles court stated that: 
[I]n a district where elections are shown usually to be polarized, the 
fact that racially polarized voting is not present in one or a few 
individual elections does not necessarily negate the conclusion that the 
district experiences legally significant bloc voting.  Furthermore, the 
success of a minority candidate in a particular election does not 
necessarily prove that the district did not experience polarized voting 
in that election; special circumstances, such as the absence of an 
opponent, incumbency, or the utilization of bullet voting, may explain 
minority electoral success in a polarized contest. 
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 57. 
 79. Campos, 840 F.2d at 1245. 
 80. In Campos, the City of Baytown attempted to argue for the inclusion of 
Precinct 248 in the cohesion correlation calculation.  Id. at 1247.  However, the 
majority explicitly affirmed the lower court’s refusal to include this particular 
district, despite the fact that Precinct 248 “is overwhelmingly Black” because 
the evidence indicated individual political control by a single individual, and 
lack of overall Black representativeness since it contained “less than 13% of the 
Black population.”  Id. at 1247–48. 
 81. Id. at 1249 (quoting Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens, Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 
999 F.2d 831, 864 (5th Cir. 1993). 
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involved the aggregation of African Americans and Hispanic 
Americans, and alleged that an at-large voting system 
functioned to dilute the votes of racial minorities in school 
board elections.85  While the Fifth Circuit ultimately denied 
the claim, the majority opinion reaffirmed the court’s express 
acceptance of minority aggregation by stating that the Fifth 
Circuit has “allow[ed] [the] aggregation of different minority 
groups where the evidence suggests that they are  
politically cohesive.”86  This express affirmation indicates the 
continuation of the Fifth Circuit’s stance on aggregation for 
the purposes of filing a section 2 claim.87  Additionally, the 
Fifth Circuit continued this trend by acknowledging the vote 
dilution claim of African Americans and Hispanic Americans 
in Latin American Citizens v. Midland Independent School 
District.88  Therefore, while the Fifth Circuit did not find vote 
dilution in every case, it did allow the minority groups to 
assert the claim in every case, and held them to the same 
standard that applies to single minorities’ section 2 claims.89 
The Eleventh Circuit also expressly accepted vote 
dilution claims filed by aggregated minorities.90  In Concerned 
Citizens of Hardee County v. Hardee County Board of 
Commissioners,91 the Eleventh Circuit heard the appeal of an 
aggregated minority group consisting of African American 
and Hispanic American residents challenging the multi-
member voting system used to elect the Hardee County 
School Board.92  The Eleventh Circuit expressly held that 
“[t]wo minority groups . . . may be a single Section 2 minority 
if they can establish that they behave in a politically cohesive 
manner.”93   In making this express determination that 
minority groups can aggregate, the opinion cited all of the 
Fifth Circuit cases, but provided no further justification.94  
The Eleventh Circuit ultimately determined that the 
 85. Geraci, supra note 25, at 396. 
 86. Clements, 999 F.2d at 864. 
 87. See id. 
 88. League of United Latin Am. Citizens, Council No. 4386 v. Midland 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 829 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1987). 
 89. See Geraci, supra note 25, at 397. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Concerned Citizens of Hardee Cnty. v. Hardee Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 
906 F.2d 524 (11th Cir. 1990). 
 92. Id. at 525. 
 93. Id. at 526. 
 94. Id. 
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aggregated minorities did not have sufficient evidence of 
cohesion to prove their claim, and that the proposed 
“functional majority” approach to satisfying the first  
Gingles requirement was unpersuasive.95  However, the most 
important aspect of the holding was the court’s overall 
agreement with the Fifth Circuit regarding its global stance 
on minority aggregation.96 
2.  Implicit Acceptance of Minority Aggregation 
Conversely, the Ninth Circuit has distinctly avoided 
making a determination as to whether minorities have the 
right to aggregate for the purposes of bringing a section 2 vote 
dilution claim under the VRA, thereby falling into the second 
category.97  In the Ninth Circuit’s first examination of this 
issue, Romero v. City of Pomona,98 an aggregated group of 
African American and Hispanic American voters jointly 
appealed the District Court for the Central District of 
California’s involuntary dismissal of the group’s section 2 
claim challenging the city’s at-large voting system.99  The 
Ninth Circuit denied the plaintiffs’ appeal to re-open the case 
based upon the minority groups’ inability to prove that the 
percent of the minority population eligible to vote could 
constitute a majority in a single-member district, and that the 
two minorities formed a politically cohesive voting group.100  
However, the Ninth Circuit did not dismiss the claim based 
on the minorities’ attempt to aggregate, but instead dismissed 
due to their inability to meet the Gingles requirements.101  By 
applying the Gingles test to the case, rather than simply 
dismissing it outright, the Ninth Circuit implicitly suggested 
that it accepted a minority’s right to aggregate to bring a 
 95. The plaintiffs in Hardee attempted to satisfy the first Gingles 
requirement by arguing that the African American group, which numerically 
comprised only 36% of the population, represented a “functional majority” 
because, at that number, given the “average white cross-over vote,” they could 
elect a “candidate of their choice.”  Id. at 527.  However, while the Eleventh 
Circuit did not expressly invalidate this theory, they found its application here 
unpersuasive.  Id. 
 96. See Geraci, supra note 25, at 397. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Romero v. City of Pomona, 883 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1989), abrogated by 
Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 914 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 99. Id. at 1420–21. 
 100. Id. at 1425, 1426–27. 
 101. Id. at 1427. 
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claim under section 2.102 
The Ninth Circuit continued to avoid expressing a direct 
decision pertaining to minority aggregation in Badillo v.  
City of Stockton.103  The Ninth Circuit determined that the 
aggregated minority group, comprised of African Americans 
and Hispanic Americans, did not meet their burden of proof 
regarding a section 2 vote dilution claim.104  Yet, the court 
once again applied the Gingles factors to the aggre- 
gated minority group.105  By continually applying the Gingles 
factors, rather than dispensing with the appeal altogether, 
the Ninth Circuit repeatedly and implicitly indicated its 
acceptance of aggregated minority groups for section 2 
purposes.106 
3.  Express Rejection of Minority Aggregation 
While all of the cases discussed thus far have either 
expressly or implicitly accepted minority aggregation for 
section 2 vote dilution claims, several circuit courts have 
implicitly or expressly rejected these cases.  In Latino 
Political Action Committee, Inc. v. City of Boston107 (L.P.A.C.), 
the plaintiffs—an aggregated group of African American, 
Asian American, and Hispanic American voters—appealed 
the decision of the District Court of Massachusetts.108  The 
groups jointly and separately alleged that the district 
configuration unnecessarily packed the minorities into three 
districts for City Council and School Committee elections, 
thereby violating section 2.109  In making its determination, 
the First Circuit only briefly mentioned that members from 
three minority groups joined in the challenge, and then 
proceeded to analyze the aggregated groups’ claims 
separately.110  By completely avoiding the combined claim, the 
First Circuit implicitly prohibited the aggregation of 
 102. Geraci, supra note 25, at 398. 
 103. Badillo v. City of Stockton, 956 F.2d 884 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 104. Id. at 886. 
 105. Id. at 890. 
 106. Geraci, supra note 25, at 398. 
 107. Latino Political Action Comm., Inc. v. City of Bos., 784 F.2d 409 (1st Cir. 
1986). 
 108. Id. at 409–10. 
 109. Id. at 410–11. 
 110. See Schulte, supra note 30, at 452. 
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minorities for section 2 vote dilution claims.111  However, 
L.P.A.C. preceded the Fifth Circuit’s cases that expressly 
affirmed minorities’ right to aggregate, which could diminish 
the application of the decision. 
The Sixth Circuit explicitly forbade the practice of 
minority aggregation for the purposes of section 2 vote 
dilution claims in Nixon v. Kent County.112  An aggregated 
minority of African American and Hispanic American voters 
appealed their unsuccessful challenge of the district 
composition for the election of the Board of County 
Commissioners.113  The minority alleged that the defendants 
“pack[ed]” the district with “an excessive percentage of 
minority voters” and split “the remaining minority voters 
among districts dominated by large white majorities.”114  The 
majority of the Sixth Circuit concluded, through the 
application of principles of statutory construction, that the 
statutory language of the VRA barred aggregated claims by 
using singular pronouns.115  However, the opinion foreclosed 
the possibility of minority aggregation under additional 
theories,116 including a lack of legislative history,117 broadened 
scope,118 and policy concerns regarding “coalition lawsuits.”119  
The opinion directly echoed the minority opinions from 
previous circuit court decisions, most notably from the Fifth 
Circuit, as discussed below.120  Ultimately, this case stands 
apart, not only because it expressly rejected minority 
aggregation, but also because it did so despite substantial 
case history that either expressly or implicitly suggested that 
 111. See id. 
 112. Nixon v. Kent Cnty., 76 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996). 
 113. Id. at 1384. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 1386–87. 
 116. Id. at 1387–91. 
 117. The Sixth Circuit supported its decision denying aggregation by 
highlighting the lack of ambiguity in the Voting Rights Act, and the complete 
lack of legislative history supporting the right to aggregate.  Id. at 1387. 
 118. In response to the plaintiffs’ argument that section 2 should be applied 
with the “broadest possible scope,” the Sixth Circuit such distinguished cases by 
highlighting an express Congressional acceptance of the practice in each case.  
Nixon v. Kent Cnty., 76 F.3d 1389 (6th Cir. 1996). 
 119. Id. at 1390.  The Sixth Circuit also highlighted the distinction between a 
minority group identified by section 2 and a coalition.  Id. at 1390–91 
(determining that a “specific finding of discrimination” functioned as the 
distinguishing factor). 
 120. Id. at 1388. 
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minority aggregation is acceptable.121 
While the Fifth Circuit emerged as the first circuit court 
to accept minority aggregation for section 2 claims, the 
decisions were not all unanimous.122  Fifth Circuit justices 
critical of minority aggregation support their rejection of the 
practice on a variety of grounds, including: a perceived lack of 
Congressional approval, an avoidance of proportional 
representation, a perceived misuse of the VRA to protect 
political interest groups, dilution of individual minority 
concerns, and an avoidance of negative policy implications for 
minority voters. 123   Judges arguing against Congressional 
authorization most frequently utilize statutory interpretation 
arguments to demonstrate a lack of Congressional intent.124  
In LULAC I, Judge Jones’ concurring opinion argued for 
bringing an end to the theory of minority aggregation for vote 
dilution claims.125   Her support for the request stemmed 
directly from her assessment of the legislative intent.126  By 
highlighting word choices in the singular rather than plural 
form, Judge Jones asserted that Congress consciously and 
affirmatively excluded the option of minority aggregation for 
section 2 vote dilution claims.127  Judge Jones argued that 
 121. See generally League of United Latin Am. Citizens Council, No. 4434 v. 
Clements, 999 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1993) (affirming the Fifth Circuit’s favorable 
stance on minority aggregation, but refusing to grant relief to the plaintiffs 
based on a lack of cohesion and evidence of white bloc voting); Concerned 
Citizens of Hardee Cnty. v. Hardee Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 906 F.2d 524 (11th 
Cir. 1990) (adopting the Fifth Circuit’s acceptance of minority aggregation, but 
finding that the particular facts of the case failed to meet the standard for 
cohesion); Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1988) (accepting 
minority aggregation, and granting the aggregated minority relief under section 
2 of the VRA); League of United Latin Am. Citizens, Council No. 4386 v. 
Midland Indep. Sch. Dist., 829 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1987) (affirming the Fifth 
Circuit’s overall approval of minority aggregation, but finding that the cohesion 
element was not sufficiently met in this case), vacated on other grounds, 829 
F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1987). 
 122. E.g., Clements, 999 F.2d at 894–99 (Jones, J., concurring) (opposing the 
use of aggregated minorities to file section 2 vote dilution claims); Midland 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 812 F.2d at 1504 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (opposing the 
Fifth Circuit’s extension of the VRA to cover aggregated minorities for the 
purposes of a section 2 vote dilution claim). 
 123. Clements, 999 F.2d at 894–99 (Jones, J., concurring). 
 124. Schulte, supra note 30, at 468. 
 125. Clements, 999 F.2d at 894–95 (Jones, J., concurring). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Judge Jones stated in her concurrence that: 
The 1982 amendment to Section 2, which codified the “results” test, 
likewise offers no textual support for a minority aggregation theory.  It 
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Congressional approval, as opposed to a lack of Congressional 
prohibition, is the key component in a statutory assessment, 
thereby providing a basis to declare minority aggregation 
statutorily unlawful.128 
Judges also challenge minority aggregation based on 
concerns that changes to the current analytical structure 
could cause the VRA to evolve unintentionally into a vehicle 
to enact a proportional representation system.129  Arguments 
regarding this theory typically rely on Congressional intent.130  
In LULAC I the concurrence by Judge Jones asserted that 
Congress purposely avoided creating the VRA in a manner 
that enacted a proportional representation system by 
specifically including a functional requirement that the 
minority group be large enough to “constitute a majority in a 
single-member district.”131  Judge Jones’ concurrence suggests 
that minority aggregation could allow aggregated minority 
groups to easily override the built-in mechanism against 
proportional representation, creating an opportunity for the 
VRA to evolve unintentionally into a proportional 
representation statute.132 
Critics of minority aggregation address their concern 
regarding the VRA evolving into a means to support political 
interest groups by employing statutory language 
arguments.133  In her concurrence in LULAC I, Judge Jones 
argued that the significance of listing each minority 
speaks only of a “class of citizens” and “a protected class.”  Had 
Congress chosen explicitly to protect minority coalitions it could have 
done so by defining the “results” test in terms of protected classes of 
citizens.  It did not.  
Id. at 894 (citations omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988)). 
 128. Judge Jones stated in her concurrence that: 
One may be uncertain what Congress might think about permitting 
minority coalitions to assert vote dilution claims, but Congress clearly 
walked a fine line in amending Section 2 to codify the results test for 
vote dilution claims while expressly prohibiting proportional 
representation for minority groups.  The results test of vote dilution 
inherently recognizes that a minority group will sometimes fail to merit 
a single-member district solely because they lack the population to 
“constitute a majority in a single-member district.”  
Id. at 895 (quoting Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50, 50 n.17 (1986)). 
 129. Schulte, supra note 30, at 470. 
 130. Id. at 455. 
 131. Clements, 999 F.2d at 895 (Jones, J., concurring). 
 132. Id. at 895–97. 
 133. Id. at 894. 
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separately within the statutory language of section 2 
warrants separate treatment and protection for different 
minorities, thereby distinguishing between racial minorities 
and language minorities.134  While Judge Jones acknowledged 
that both types of groups enjoy individual protection, she 
argued that allowing them to aggregate based on a showing of 
cohesion under the Gingles factors simply protects a group 
that votes in a politically cohesive manner.135  This line of 
argument contends that separate listings correspond to 
individual selection based on specific and distinct qualities 
shared by the minority.136  Allowing minorities to file a claim, 
absent the shared quality, allows the group to gain protection 
under section 2 of the VRA based on similar political 
ideologies, and does not serve the VRA’s ultimate goals.137  
Similarly, in League of United Latin American Citizens v. 
Midland Independent School District, Judge Higginbotham’s 
dissent suggested that allowing aggregation for section 2 
claims could encourage minorities to unite over an issue or 
political agenda, unrelated to discriminatory voting 
practices. 138   This practice would similarly encourage the 
formation of interest groups rather than ensure that minority 
votes are equally as powerful as white votes.139 
Similarly, judges opposed to minority aggregation argue 
that allowing minorities to aggregate for section 2 purposes 
could dilute the claims of each individual minority group or 
cause racial friction.140 Allowing aggregation could encourage 
each minority to strive towards unnatural homogeneity with 
another minority group solely for the purposes of filing a 
section 2 claim, encouraging false cohesion, and a general 
societal assumption of minority homogeneity.141 
Ultimately, the majority of courts have allowed 
aggregation either by expressly or implicitly accepting the 
practice, although the courts appear unlikely to find in favor 
 134. See id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See Schulte, supra note 30, at 455–56. 
 137. See Clements, 999 F.2d at 894 (Jones, J., concurring). 
 138. League of United Latin Am. Citizens, Council No. 4386 v. Midland 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 812 F.2d 1494, 1504 (5th Cir. 1987) (Higginbotham, J., 
dissenting), vacated on other grounds, 829 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1987). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Clements, 999 F.2d at 897–98 (Jones, J., concurring). 
 141. See Geraci, supra note 25, at 401. 
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of the aggregated minority without a strong showing of 
cohesion.142  However, the arguments presented indicate that 
minority aggregation claims have not received consistent 
treatment in the federal courts.143  This inconsistency appears 
to stem not simply from the disagreement over the validity of 
minority aggregation, but also due to the lack of guidance 
regarding what an aggregated group must prove for the 
purpose of a section 2 claim.144  By eliminating the ambiguity 
the entire discussion surrounding minority aggregation could 
be resolved.145 
II. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM 
Despite the effect of the VRA and other methods meant 
to protect racial minorities’ voting equality, 
disenfranchisement issues still exist.  Critics of aggregation 
take issue with the application of the Gingles test to minority 
groups attempting to aggregate for section 2 purposes.146  
Minorities that seek protection under section 2 of the VRA 
challenge the effectiveness of the Gingles test by arguing that 
a vote dilution claim could still exist even if the Gingles 
factors are not satisfied.147  Due to those competing interests, 
many scholars view the strict requirements of Gingles as a 
bar to the expansion of voting rights jurisprudence. 148  
However, the United States is rapidly increasing in the 
diversity of its population.149  Large minority groups that 
have recently emigrated or established themselves in the 
United States have an increasing interest in protecting the 
effectiveness of their vote.150   Moreover, some argue that 
when Congress drafted the VRA, and the Supreme Court 
formulated the Gingles requirements, neither Congress nor 
the Supreme Court could foresee the future minority diversity 
increase in the United States.151  While the language of the 
VRA extends to large groups of minorities, the factors 
 142. Ancheta & Imahara, supra note 10, at 845. 
 143. Schulte, supra note 30, at 454. 
 144. See id. at 452. 
 145. See id. 
 146. Id. at 468–76. 
 147. See Ancheta & Imahara, supra note 10, at 847–48. 
 148. See id. at 845–48. 
 149. State and County QuickFacts: USA, supra note 1. 
 150. See Ta, supra note 8, at 92–95. 
 151. Id. at 110–11. 
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outlined in Gingles pose inherent limitations upon smaller 
racial groups attempting to bring section 2 claims.152  Since 
the analysis focuses on the geographic isolation of large 
populations, scholars suggest that other factors could more 
appropriately assess the dilution of a minority’s vote. 153  
Additionally, scholars and racial minorities argue that  
the rigidity of this elemental analysis, combined with  
the requirements, only has the capacity to protect 
disenfranchised African Americans, and therefore requires a 
revisitation.154  This commentary creates two issues: the first 
is a need for clarity regarding what minorities must prove 
under the Gingles test, and the second is the need for a 
reexamination of the Gingles test to assess if it accurately 
addresses minority vote dilution claims. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A.  The Gingles Standard as Applied to Aggregated 
Minorities 
While neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has 
expressly adopted minority aggregation, its general 
treatment, as discussed previously, suggests general 
viability.155  The next logical question is what standards apply 
to a section 2 claim brought by aggregated minorities?  The 
Supreme Court partially addressed this issue in Growe v. 
Emison, stating that “to establish a vote-dilution claim . . . a 
plaintiff must prove three threshold conditions.”156  However, 
the opinion did not merely stop at the Gingles requirements, 
but subtly suggested that minorities may have to meet the 
requirements at a higher level.157  By discussing the “higher-
than-usual need for the second of the Gingles showings,” the 
Supreme Court suggested a heightened standard with regard 
to the cohesion of aggregated groups.158  Further, the opinion 
makes reference to statistical evidence to prove the second 
and third Gingles factors pertaining to cohesion and majority 
 152. Ancheta & Imahara, supra note 10, at 845–48. 
 153. Ta, supra note 8, at 110–11. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Geraci, supra note 25, at 394–95. 
 156. Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 39–40 (1993). 
 157. Id. at 41. 
 158. Id. 
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bloc voting.159  These suggestions appear to require more from 
minorities seeking to aggregate, than from single minorities 
without articulating specifically defined boundaries in non-
Gingles terms.  However, two scholarly perspectives have 
developed.  The first perspective offered by critics of minority 
aggregation supports a higher standard for cohesion in 
aggregated minorities for section 2 claims.160  Conversely, the 
second perspective argues for a new set of requirements that 
takes into account the ethnic diversity of the United States, 
and draws support from the fact that smaller minority groups 
normally cannot meet the size requirements to singularly 
assert a section 2 claim.161  This perspective argues that  
a lower threshold could ensure broader coverage  
and potentially eliminate the need to aggregate.162   Both 
perspectives acknowledge the concerns surrounding 
aggregation, but reach conflicting solutions. 
B. Proffered Improvements and Alternative Systems 
In contrast to the suggestions posed by various minority 
groups seeking changes to the Gingles framework, several 
scholars support retention of at least some semblance of the 
Gingles analysis but would require stronger showings for 
aggregated minorities.  Specifically, the scholars suggest 
more stringent tests regarding the cohesion of the aggregated 
groups.163  All of the tests primarily draw upon the arguments 
made by Judges Higginbotham and Jones of the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals in his Midland Independent School District 
dissent and her LULAC I concurrence, respectively.164  Two of 
them are discussed below.   
The test proffered by the Honorable Rick G. Strange of 
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals suggests that courts 
should apply a threshold determination to aggregated  
groups before completing a Gingles analysis.165  Strange’s  
test examines “whether the members of the aggregated 
groups have similar socio-economic backgrounds,” “whether 
 159. Id. 
 160. See generally Strange, supra note 38, at 113. 
 161. See generally Ta, supra note 8, at 90–91. 
 162. See id. at 101. 
 163. See Schulte, supra note 30, at 457–59. 
 164. Id. at 458. 
 165. Id. at 457. 
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[they] have similar attitudes toward significant issues 
affecting the challenged entity,” and “whether [they] have 
consistently voted for the same candidates.”166  Particularly, 
Strange’s approach accepts aggregation as “theoretically 
permissible” if the discrimination has a collective effect on 
different minority groups.167  In Strange’s estimation, these 
factors more accurately determines if the minorities are 
properly aggregated based on similar political causes and 
concerns, since aggregated minorities do not share common 
ground based on race or national origin, their cohesion  
relies solely upon shared values.168  Therefore, requiring this 
threshold analysis properly addresses whether their level of 
political concern and similarity qualifies as a sufficient 
finding of cohesion.169 
The Strange approach draws upon several social science 
studies, which indicate that America’s racial minority groups 
expressly exhibit “political heterogeneity.”170   Examples of 
this racial divergence occur in several states with diverse 
minority populations, such as Florida and California.171  This 
divergence not only makes it highly unlikely that minorities 
can demonstrate the proper level of cohesion in order to 
aggregate, but also leads critics to highlight the potential for 
inter-minority violence, increased racial hostility and 
animosity-based on a correlation between the political success 
of a distinct minority group, or groups, and inter-minority 
 166. Strange, supra note 38, at 129. 
 167. Id. at 127. 
 168. See id. at 112, 134–36. 
 169. See, e.g., id. at 130. 
 170. The study in the Geraci article refers to a national survey, which tested 
attitudes toward specific political parties, policy decisions, and overall country 
goals.  Geraci, supra note 25, at 401.  The results indicated a nineteen-point 
difference in the Republican Party’s approval ratings between African 
Americans and Asian Americans, and a twenty-nine percent difference in 
approval of Ronald Reagan and President Bush’s economic policies between 
African Americans and “Southeast-Asians, Indians, and Afghanis.”  Id.  Finally, 
the study indicated that while African Americans viewed “giving people more 
say in important political decisions” as the most important national issue, Asian 
Americans and Hispanic Americans “felt that maintaining order was 
paramount.”  Id.  
 171. In Florida, the Cuban and African American minorities have an intense 
rivalry and deep resentment for one another, complete with riot attempts and 
economic boycotts of businesses run by the other minority.  Id. at 402–03.  In 
California, racial tensions exist between African American and Hispanic 
American minorities.  Id. at 403–05.  This tension involves police brutality and 
a deep-seeded lack of political support between the two minorities.  Id. 
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conflict.172   Therefore, encouraging aggregation as a remedy 
to vote dilution could unintentionally cause general minority 
identity dilution, a homogenous societal attitude toward 
minorities, and increased minority hostility.173  This model 
could eliminate concerns regarding the dilution of individual 
minorities’ interests and the support of special-interest 
coalitions as opposed to disenfranchised minorities by making 
a detailed assessment of the groups’ shared values.174 
Additionally, Strange suggests that this approach more 
accurately reflects and protects the Congressional intent of 
preventing discrimination while preserving the republican 
form of government, since there is a fundamental difference 
between a minority losing an election for lack of political 
support and losing due to racial or ethnic discrimination.175  
Such a test also restrains judicial review and involvement in 
reapportionment, a traditionally legislative responsibility, by 
requiring the minority group to meet a threshold level of 
cohesion to file the claim, thereby lessening the number of 
judicially created districts.176   The goals of this approach 
attempt to make aggregation work within the current 
framework of Gingles by merely adding a threshold test 
requiring a heightened showing of cohesion for aggregated 
groups to file section 2 claims.177 
Another test, known as the “minority-groups-as-one 
test,” 178  suggested by Professors Katharine Butler and 
Richard Murray, proposes an assessment of “whether the two 
groups consider themselves one under circumstances in which 
each group can benefit separately,” requiring a finding that 
the minority groups are “indeed one” and “shared a 
discriminatory treatment at the hands of the majority.”179  By 
focusing on the level of cohesion, this standard furthers 
Butler and Murray’s view that minorities are not simply 
fungible entities and, that by treating them as such, the  
true purpose of the VRA is not served.180  Most importantly,  
 172. See, e.g., id. at 404–05. 
 173. Id. at 398–406. 
 174. See Strange, supra note 38, at 154. 
 175. See id. at 113. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 128–29. 
 178. Schulte, supra note 30, at 464. 
 179. Id. at 458. 
 180. Id. 
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they believe that minorities are protected based on their 
particular experiences with discrimination, and their  
defining differences inherently lack cohesion.181  For example, 
discrimination against African Americans began with slavery, 
while Hispanic discrimination began with cultural and 
linguistic differences, and Japanese discrimination began 
during World War II.182  Further, Butler and Murray’s test 
particularly prizes social science data that is skeptical of true 
minority cohesion, and therefore aggregation generally. 183  
Ultimately, the proposal seeks to heighten the cohesion 
element of the Gingles test, and alter the focus to more 
stringently assess the level of cohesion between the 
minorities, thereby requiring a heightened standard for 
aggregated section 2 claims. 
C.  Issues Within the Current Thornburg v. Gingles 
Framework   
As discussed above, scholars and an increasing number of 
minority groups in the United States have identified that 
Congress passed the VRA primarily to stop African American 
disenfranchisement, and to ensure the group’s equal voting 
strength.184  To that end, critics of the Gingles framework, 
and minority aggregation in general, agree that the current 
system does not adequately protect the Congressional  
intent behind the VRA or provide protection for the  
diverse minority populations.185  While the primary concerns 
of minority aggregation critics were previously discussed, 
minorities seeking protection under the VRA raise additional 
issues with regard to each individual prong of the Gingles 
analysis.186 
First, several minority groups challenge both 
requirements of the first Gingles prong187 by suggesting that 
the Supreme Court intended a less stringent requirement 
 181. Id. at 464. 
 182. Id. at 458, 464. 
 183. Id. at 465. 
 184. Id. at 442. 
 185. Ta, supra note 8, at 101. 
 186. Id. at 101, 103–04, 107. 
 187. The first Gingles prong requires a minority group to demonstrate that it 
is “sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in 
single-member district.”  Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 (1986). 
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regarding the minority’s population size.188  Primarily, they 
suggest that Gingles did not require the ability to comprise a 
majority in a single-member district, and that the current 
requirement is a fiction created by the lower courts.189  This 
fiction creates a barrier preventing minority groups that 
represent as much as fifty percent of the population from 
filing a section 2 claim.190  In this sense, the Gingles standard 
eliminates an entire portion of the minority population from 
seeking protection for vote dilution, based simply on a 
requirement promulgated by the lower courts.191  Requiring 
this minority population showing firmly limits the scope of 
the VRA against the specific legislative authorization to 
protect these smaller minority groups.192 
Critics also challenge the first prong’s requirement of 
compactness by arguing that the compactness requirement 
merely serves as a strict functional requirement, not 
applicable to all minority groups.193  Minority groups utilizing 
this line of reasoning suggest that the compactness 
requirement reflects how the VRA’s history is deeply rooted 
in an African American model of disenfranchisement. 194  
While it may have been common for African American 
minority groups to live in a concentrated setting at the 
adoption of the VRA, social scientists suggest that the living 
situations of other minority communities, such as Asians and 
Hispanics, do not fit into a compact model, and therefore 
would necessarily fail this required Gingles element.195 
Next, the second Gingles prong requires political cohesion 
amongst the minority groups bringing a section 2 vote 
dilution claim.196  Within the Asian American community  
this requirement has garnered criticism based on the  
 188. Ta, supra note 8, at 101. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Ancheta & Imahara, supra note 10, at 846. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (2006)). 
 193. Ta, supra note 8, at 101–03. 
 194. Id. 
 195. “Scholars have repeatedly pointed out that the Supreme Court’s 
requirement of ‘geographically compactness’ is not applicable to APIs and 
Latinos because both groups live in less compact areas and are more dispersed 
than African Americans.”  Id. at 103. 
 196. Id. 
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diversity of Asian groups present in the United States.197  
Asian American groups filing a section 2 claim as a group of 
Asian Americans may only meet the cohesive- 
ness requirement for Asian candidates.198  Given the group’s 
diversity regarding a variety of factors, such as length of time 
they have lived in the United States, age, and cultural 
differences, their politics may diverge in the absence of an 
Asian American candidate.199  Further, the Asian American 
population specifically appears to be in a state of political 
transition based on the length of time spent in the United 
States and the growing population of young first generation 
American-born children. 200   While this argument directly 
contrasts with criticism of minority aggregation regarding the 
formation of interest groups, it poses a real difficulty for 
minority groups that seek and feel that they require 
protection under the VRA, but are comprised of multiple 
smaller, specific populations.201  Additionally, if the smaller 
fractional groups attempted to bring a section 2 claim, they 
would have difficulty meeting the first Gingles 
requirement.202 
Finally, as to the third prong, 203  minorities seeking 
protection under the VRA argue that the assessment of a 
white voting bloc poses challenges based on the increasing 
difficulty of distinguishing such a voting bloc.204  Additionally, 
requiring the white voting bloc provides an opportunity for 
smaller portions of a fragmented minority group to become 
subsumed within the larger umbrella minority category, 
allowing for an entirely new form of dilution.205  Further, the 
Supreme Court has specifically stated that “[u]nless [the 
Gingles preconditions] are established, there neither has been 
 197. Id. at 103–05. 
 198. See id. at 105–06. 
 199. See id. 
 200. See id.  
 201. Id. at 106–07. 
 202. Id. at 102. 
 203. The third Gingles prong requires a minority group to prove that “the 
white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it . . . to defeat the 
minority’s preferred candidate.”  Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 51 (1986). 
 204. Ta, supra note 8, at 107–08. 
 205. Ta suggests that in a state such as California, which has a minority 
majority, the Gingles test can be ineffective in instances where the votes of 
combined separate minority groups outnumber those of an opposing white 
voting bloc.  Id. at 107. 
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a wrong nor can be a remedy,” indicating that courts cannot 
simply presume white bloc voting. 206  Instead the plaintiffs 
must prove it, along with the other preconditions.207  These 
concerns regarding the Gingles standard indicate that the 
approach creates several issues and barriers regarding the 
protection of other minority groups beyond the white 
majority/African American minority model, and definitely 
amongst groups attempting to aggregate.208 
These concerns led scholars with a more favorable 
outlook on minority aggregation to focus on different 
alterations to the Gingles standard, especially in cases 
concerning multi-ethnic communities.209  Professors Angelo N. 
Ancheta and Kathryn K. Imahara pose two contrasting 
theoretical outlooks on minority aggregation.210  The first 
proposes that minority groups are drawn together and vote 
based on discrimination that they have jointly suffered, 
suggesting the possibility of successful minority aggregation 
for the purposes of section 2 claims.211  However, the second 
theory states that the differences inherent in minority 
groups, based on their varying history and culture, draws 
them apart, making minority aggregation impossible.212  The 
resulting divergence of these theories requires a case-by-case 
analysis of whether any group of minorities can aggregate 
based on the specific factual underpinnings of their section 2 
claim.213  Ancheta and Imahara suggest that a case-by-case 
analysis of the potential for minority aggregation will be 
driven by how large the minority communities are in relation 
to the white majority, whether the minority communities 
share common problems, and whether the minority 
populations share important social and economic concerns.214  
In suggesting the potential for aggregation, Ancheta and 
Imahara draw upon favorable social science studies finding 
evidence of minority cohesion when shared interests are 
 206. Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 40–41 (1993). 
 207. Id. 
 208. Ta, supra note 8, at 101–09. 
 209. Ancheta & Imahara, supra note 10, at 835–40. 
 210. Id. at 830–32. 
 211. Id. at 830–31. 
 212. Id. at 831–32. 
 213. Id. at 832–33. 
 214. Id. at 833. 
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involved.215  The scholars suggest that minorities found to be 
cohesive—and thus truly able to aggregate—will be small in 
comparison to the white majority population, will share 
common problems, and will share important social and 
economic concerns.216 
However, Ancheta and Imahara also acknowledge the 
under-inclusive nature of Gingles in multi-ethnic 
communities—specifically regarding situations when the 
totality of the circumstances indicates vote dilution—by 
meeting all of the Senate Report Factors, but failing to satisfy 
the functional Gingles requirement for size and dispersion.217  
This critique suggests revisiting the Gingles factors to craft a 
standard that protects the groups requiring protection under 
section 2 of the VRA.218 
All of these concerns suggest the need for system-wide 
change to create a standard that allows all minorities affected 
by vote dilution to bring claims under section 2.219  These 
challenges begin to suggest that alteration of the Gingles 
standards could eliminate the debate regarding minority 
aggregation because each individual minority could file its 
own claim in the absence of stringent numerical 
requirements. 
IV. PROPOSAL  
This Comment proposes a solution that attempts to 
address minority aggregation in two ways.  First, by 
reconstructing the analytical system for the VRA and thereby 
decreasing the need for minority aggregation, Congress 
grants section 2 the broad reach intended at its inception.  
Second, by specifically outlining an analytical approach and 
standards for section 2 claims, Congress ensures uniform 
treatment to aggregated minorities.  This approach begins by 
first assessing if the claim of the minority groups pertains to 
a community with a high level of multi-ethnic diversity.  This 
diversity assessment will be based on the population 
 215. “A number of studies have found that minorities can form coalitions and 
support candidates when the issues at stake are of common interest.”  Id. at 
832. 
 216. Id. at 833–34. 
 217. Id. at 839. 
 218. See id. at 845–47. 
 219. See id. 
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percentages of each voting age eligible minority population.  
If several groups of minorities each compose a statistically 
significant amount of the population, approximately ten 
percent or more, then claims of single or aggregated 
minorities in that community will be assessed using a 
modified Gingles analysis.  However, communities with a 
single distinctive minority group will continue to be assessed 
under the current Gingles standards. 
A. Modified Gingles Analysis   
The modified Gingles standard could apply to minority 
groups representing less than ten percent of the district’s 
total population and will retain the same factors for assessing 
section 2 claims, but require a lesser showing of certain 
elements.  First, by encouraging a less strict requirement 
regarding size and compactness, requiring that the groups 
only prove that they are reasonably large and geographically 
compact.  To meet the modified size and dispersion 
requirements the group would only have to prove that it has 
the ability to effect the outcome of an election in a 
statistically significant way.  Currently, the lower courts 
interpret the “sufficiently large” and “geographically compact” 
Gingles requirement as requiring the minority group to prove 
that it could constitute a majority in a single-member 
district. 220   However, this standard definitively eliminates 
vote dilution claims by minority populations comprising as 
much as fifty percent of the population within a district.221  
Moreover, studies indicate that not all minority groups live in 
the condensed community setting required by Gingles. 222  
Precedent for this change exists in voting acts created within 
individual states.  California’s Voting Rights Act states that 
“[t]he fact that members of a protected class are not 
geographically compact or concentrated may not preclude a 
finding of racially polarized voting, or a violation of Section 
14027.”223  Minimizing the burden of meeting this Gingles 
requirement and applying the reasonableness showing on a 
case-by-case basis, achieves both of the proposals goals, by 
allowing smaller minorities to file a section 2 claim alone, 
 220. Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240, 1244 (5th Cir. 1988). 
 221. Ancheta & Imahara, supra note 10, at 845–46. 
 222. Ta, supra note 8, at 103. 
 223. California Voting Rights Act, CAL. ELEC. CODE § 14028(c) (West 2010). 
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lessening the need to aggregate, and simultaneously outlining 
the standard of review for an aggregated minority group.  
Additionally, while this change appears to contrast with the 
Supreme Court’s recent decision regarding an “intermediate 
‘crossover’ district” in Bartlett v. Strickland,224 this change 
appears to be the most feasible way to cover the effected 
minority groups. 
Analyzing the cohesion of the minority groups according 
to the non-heightened standard outlined by the Campos court 
should also be encouraged to promote aggregation amongst 
minority groups comprising less than ten percent of their 
district’s population.  In Campos the majority stated that the 
proper standard of minority cohesion under Gingles was 
simply “whether the minority group together votes in a 
cohesive manner for the minority candidate.”225  In assessing 
this standard, the court should focus specifically on elections 
involving a minority candidate and look at the statistical 
patterns of the entire group regarding support for a candidate 
of either minority.226  Successful claims will demonstrate that 
the group votes for the minority candidate to an acceptable 
level of statistical significance.  In making this assessment 
the court can take into account the factors, such as those 
enumerated by Strange—including whether aggregated 
groups have similar socio-economic backgrounds or attitudes 
toward overarching community issues—but the court should 
primarily base its decision on the statistical evidence. 227  
Ultimately, this cohesion analysis supports both of the 
proposal’s goals of broad application by lessening the need to 
aggregate and outlining specific standards for aggregated 
minorities. 
 Finally, retaining the third Gingles factor ensures that 
government intervention only assists groups if their lack of 
representation corresponds to discriminatory behavior.  
Traditionally, this final Gingles requirement served to protect 
 224. Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1236–41 (2009) (affirming the 
decision of the Supreme Court of North Carolina and holding that section 2 
relief requires proof that a minority constitutes more than 50% of the district’s 
population, as opposed to a mere influence district).  The Supreme Court 
described influence districts as a district in which “a minority group composes a 
numerical working majority of the voting-age population.”  Id. at 1236. 
 225. Campos, 840 F.2d at 1245. 
 226. See id. 
 227. Strange, supra note 38, at 129. 
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the legislative intent behind the VRA by requiring that the 
lack of minority representation correspond to racial 
polarization or a discriminatory practice, rather than a 
simple lack of political support.228  By continuing to require 
an adequate showing of racial polarization and vote dilution 
at the forefront of the analysis, this final requirement guards 
against concerns expressed by critics of minority 
aggregation—regarding proportional representation and the 
promotion of political interest groups—allowing the element 
to retain its protective function over the VRA’s express 
purpose. 
CONCLUSION 
 America’s turbulent history regarding minority groups 
makes voting rights issues sensitive and contentious. 229  
While the United States expands and develops, the legal 
remedies for minority disenfranchisement must evolve to 
meet the country’s changing needs.230  Scholarship and state 
enactments of voting rights legislation indicates that the 
Gingles factors prevent Section 2 of the VRA from adequately 
protecting minorities from vote dilution.231  However, drastic 
and unwarranted change could inadvertently alter our 
republican form of government.232  Congress respected that 
foundation when it developed and enacted the VRA to protect 
the political interests of America’s minorities.233  However, 
the interest in preserving the foundation elements of the VRA 
and the U.S. voting system in general do not completely bar 
evolution of the requirements to bring a section 2 challenge.  
Historically, the VRA formed around the African American 
minority and was based upon the traditional patterns 
representative of that minority group.234  Current minority 
 228. See Ta, supra note 8, at 107. 
 229. See supra Introduction. 
 230. See Ta, supra note 8, at 101. 
 231. See California Voting Rights Act, CAL. ELEC. CODE § 14028(c) (West 
2010); Ancheta & Imahara, supra note 10, at 845–47. 
 232. See Schulte, supra note 30, at 470. 
 233. Judge Jones’ concurrence suggests that the VRA does not apply to 
coalitions because “Congress did not authorize the pursuit of Section 2 vote 
dilution claims by coalitions of distinct ethnic and language minorities.”  League 
of United Latin Am. Citizens, Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 894 
(5th Cir. 1993) (Jones, J., concurring). 
 234. See Ta, supra note 8, at 103. 
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populations diverge from that model in both subtle and 
drastic ways.235  Therefore, an updated test with broader 
coverage, accounting for the competing interests of minority 
groups and incorporating standards that acknowledge the 
different characteristics of the growing minority populations 
in the United States, is necessary to acknowledge and protect 
the increasingly diverse population.  However, structuring 
the test to protect the form of representation present in the 
United States, could solve the contentious aggregation 
discussion while protecting the diverse ethnic communities. 
 
 
 235. See id. 
